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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE
GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: A LEGAL
AND APPROPRIATE LINKAGE?
STEPHANIE SWITZER*
Abstract This article will question the legality of measures of environ-
mental ‘conditionality’ in the Generalized System of Preferences [GSP] of
the European Community [EC].1 The GSP is a GATT/WTO2 authorized
scheme which permits developed nations to grant non-reciprocal tariff
preferences in favour of developing countries.3 The objectives of the GSP
are primarily development-oriented in that it aims to increase the export
earnings of developing countries, promote their industrialization and acceler-
ate rates of economic growth.4 A recent case taken in the WTO examined the
legal contours of the grant of tariff preferences and it is in the light of this that
this article will examine the so-called ‘special incentive arrangements’ of the
reformed EC GSP which offers additional tariff preferences to developing
countries on the ‘condition’ that they adhere to speciﬁed standards of en-
vironmental protection.
* The author would like to thank Joe McMahon for useful feedback he provided on an
original draft of this article. Any errors are the author’s own.
1 The legal base for the GSP is Art 133 EC. Since action is taken under the EC pillar, the term
European Community/Communities shall be used. In addition, Art XI of the WTO Agreement
(n6) on ‘original membership’ refers speciﬁcally to the ‘European Communities’ and not the
European Union. The terms European Community and European Communities shall thus be used
interchangeably throughout the body of this article.
2 The conceptual underpinnings of the GSP, however, can be traced to the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and more particularly, its ﬁrst Secretary
General, Dr Raul Prebisch. See R Prebisch, ‘Towards a New Trade Policy for Development:
Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’
(United Nations, New York, 1964). Dr Prebisch argued that it was essential for developing
countries to diversify their economic base and emphasized the importance of export oriented
growth through industrialization. In relation, Prebisch contended that preferential treatment for
the industrial exports of developing countries could assist their domestic industries to overcome
initial problems such as high start up costs. Preferences would guarantee a wider product market
for the goods of developing countries and economies of scale would be realized which would in
turn enable the lowering of costs.
3 For a relatively up-to-date overview of the GSP system please see Santos et al,
‘Generalized System of Preferences in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade
Organisation: History and Current Issues’ (2005) 39 Journal of World Trade 637.
4 Resolution 21 (II), in, Final Act and Report of UNCTAD II, Annex 1 (United Nations,
New York, 1968).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Given the legal uncertainty that currently exists with regard to measures of
environmental conditionality in GSP schemes, this article shall attempt to
provide a detailed and comprehensive statement in relation to this complex
area of law. Part II provides a brief summary of the history of ‘conditionality’
in trade relations and examines its usage within the GSP. Part III details the
development of the GSP of the European Communities and examines the
legislative background to environmental conditionality in the GSP. Part IV
focuses upon the WTO dispute between India and the EC (hereinafter
EC–Tariff Preferences) and details the ﬁndings of the WTO dispute settlement
body. Part V examines the environmental conditionality of the new EC GSP5
in the light of the jurisprudential pronouncements in EC–Tariff Preferences
and attempts to assess its legality, while Part VI looks to the future of the GSP
and suggests a number of proposals for reform.
II. CONDITIONALITY AND TRADE RELATIONS
Relations between States in the world trade order are based upon the twin
pillars of non-discrimination and reciprocity of concessions. The demand for
non-discrimination manifests itself in a most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause
contained in Article I.1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),6 one of the so-called ‘covered agreements’ of the WTO. The MFN
clause ensures formal equality of treatment between contracting parties to the
GATT/WTO by mandating that any advantage or privilege extended to the
product of one country must be extended ‘immediately and unconditionally’
to the goods of all other countries party to the WTO. Reciprocity of conces-
sions between States relates to the premise that one must give in order to
receive. Reciprocity demands that any tariff reduction by a country must be
‘paid’ for by a reciprocal, though not necessarily identical, concession on the
part of other contracting States. Equality of treatment is therefore mirrored by
reciprocity of concessions.
There are numerous exceptions to this demand for formal equality
and reciprocity. One of these exceptions is the Generalized System of
5 Council Regulation 980/2005/EC Applying a Scheme of Generalized Tariff Preferences
[2005] OJ L 169/1.
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 15 Apr 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867 UNTS 187, 33 ILM 1153
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. The WTO was created as a result of Uruguay Round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations. These negotiations were structured around the GATT 1947, a pro-
visional trade ‘agreement’ or protocol drafted to ensure the reduction of tariff barriers between
parties. GATT 1947 remained essentially unchanged from the date of its signing. The GATT 1947
was updated during the Uruguay Round and became GATT 1994 which is itself one of the core or
‘covered agreements’ of the WTO.
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Preferences (GSP) which, as noted above, permits developed nations to
grant non-reciprocal tariff preferences in favour of developing countries
without extending such advantages to developed countries. The GSP
is granted legal authority by way of an instrument called the Enabling
Clause,7 a GATT document which allows Members to derogate from their
obligations under Article 1.1 of GATT 1994 in order to accord differential and
more favourable treatment to developing countries. Paragraph 2(a) of the
Enabling Clause permits developed countries, ‘notwithstanding the provisions
of Article 1 of the GATT . . . (to) accord preferential treatment to products
originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized
System of Preferences without according such treatment to other Members’.
Footnote 3 to the Enabling Clause deﬁnes ‘Generalized System of
Preferences’ by reference to the system outlined in a 1971 GATT waiver8
which provided the original legal footing within the GATT for the establish-
ment of ‘generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences
beneﬁcial to the developing countries’.
In contrast to the obligation contained in Article I.1 GATT which requires
MFN treatment to be extended unconditionally to all other Member countries,
there is no provision in the Enabling Clause to the effect that the grant
of preferences must be ‘unconditional’. Bartels has described how GSP
beneﬁciaries have been subject to ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ conditionalities.9
Positive conditionality functions as an incentive to the extent that additional
preferences are granted to beneﬁciaries in return for compliance with certain
standards of behaviour. Negative conditionality operates to withdraw tariff
preferences from existing GSP beneﬁciaries for infractions of certain con-
ditions as set out by the preference-granting State. Positive conditionality
therefore accords to the use of the GSP as a carrot while negative
conditionality is reﬂective of the utilization of preferences as a method of
punishment.
Acts of negative conditionality are synonymous with the GSP system of the
United States which contains various mandatory and discretionary criteria
applicable to developing country eligibility.10 The operation of negative
7 Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries (28 Nov 1979) BISD 26S/203, GATT Doc L/4903 (1979).
8 Generalized System of Preferences Waiver Decision (25 June 1971) BISD 18S/24, GATT
Doc L/3545 (1971).
9 L Bartels, ‘The WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionality in the European
Community’s GSP Program’ (2003) 6 Journal of International Economic Law 507, 508.
10 For an overview of the current US regime instituting the GSP please see, US Generalized
System of Preferences Guidebook (2006) available at<http://www.ustr.gov> (last accessed 30
Sept 2006) and, for example, 19 USC · 2462(b)(2) listing mandatory criteria which each country
must fulﬁl before being designated a GSP beneﬁciary. Countries must not be ‘dominated by
international communism’, must not harbour or offer sanctuary to ‘any individual who has com-
mitted an act of international terrorism’ and must have taken steps or be taking steps towards
implementing internationally recognized labour standards. 19 USC · 2462 (c) lists ‘discretionary’
criteria applicable to beneﬁciaries of the US GSP.
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conditionality under the United States’ GSP has resulted in the withdrawal of
tariff concessions from ‘problematic States’ as punishment for their lack of
cooperation. Such arguments regarding United States use of the GSP are
far from novel.11 In a study by Drahos of United States trade action against
developing countries in the GATT between 1984 and 1993, a systemic pattern
emerged that ‘almost every developing country that opposed the US at the
GATT ended up being listed for bilateral attention by the US’, either through
the section 30112 process or its GSP programme.13
Negative conditionality14 exists in the provisions of the current GSP
scheme of the EC,15 although the Community has in general shied away from
withdrawing tariff preferences from developing countries otherwise eligible
for tariff preferences. The ﬁrst and only withdrawal of preferences under the
EC scheme occurred in 1997 when the Union of Myanmar was suspended
from receipt of tariff preferences due to alleged forced labour practices.16
A Regulation was promulgated in December 2006 authorizing temporary
withdrawal of GSP concessions from Belarus for alleged violation of the right
to collective bargaining and freedom of association. This Regulation entered
into force on 21 June 2007.17
11 See generally R Bhala, ‘The Limits of American Generosity’ (2003) 29 Fordham Journal of
International Law 299. See also Jones, ‘Generalized System of Preferences: Background and
Renewal Debate’ (update 24 Jan 2007), Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
Order Code RL33663 which notes that some US supporters of the GSP take the view that con-
ditionality ‘provide[s] the United States with international political leverage that can be used to
preserve US foreign and commercial interests’ at CRS-24.
12 Unilateral enforcement measures have previously been authorized under s 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974 which accords the United States Trade Representative the authority to ‘withdraw,
limit, or suspend [duty free treatment]’ in a ‘case in which the act, policy, or practice also fails to
meet eligibility criteria for receiving duty free treatment’ applicable to the grant of GSP conces-
sions, 19 USC · 2411 (c)(1)(C).
13 P Drahos and M Braithwaite, ‘Hegemony Based on Knowledge: The Role of Intellectual
Property’ in J Chen and G Walker (eds) Balancing Act: Law, Policy and Politics in Globalisation
and Global Trade (The Federation Press, Leichhardt, 2004) 213.
14 Council Regulation (EC) 980/2005 Applying a Scheme of Generalized Tariff Preferences
[2005] OJ L 169/1 Art 16 authorizes temporary withdrawal in the event of; (a) serious and
systematic violations of human and labour rights as deﬁned in Part A of Annex III to the
Regulation, (b) export of goods made by prison labour, (c) failure to control export of illegal drugs
and/or failure to comply with international conventions on money laundering, (d) unfair trading
practices affecting the EC, (e) infringement of agreements pertaining to sustainable management
of ﬁshery stocks.
15 Negative conditionality was formally introduced by way of Council Regulation (EC) 3281/
94 Applying a four-year Scheme of Generalized Tariff Preferences (1995–8) in Respect of Certain
Industrial Products Originating in Developing Countries [1994] OJ L 348/1 Art 12 and Council
Regulation [EC] 1256/96 Applying Multiannual Schemes of Generalized Tariff Preferences from
1 July 1996 to 30 June 1999 in Respect of Certain Agricultural Products Originating in
Developing Countries [1996] OJ L 166/1 Art 12.
16 Council Regulation (EC) 552/97 Temporarily withdrawing Access to Generalized Tariff
Preferences from the Union of Myanmar [1997] OJ L 85/8.
17 Council Regulation (EC) 1933/2006 Temporarily withdrawing Access to the Generalized
Tariff preferences from the Republic of Belarus [2006] OJ L 405/35.
116 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
The history of the preference system of the EC has thus been one of
avoidance of ‘GSP-linked sanctions.’18 However, in the last decade increased
emphasis has been placed upon positive conditionality within the GSP of the
EC. The next section will examine the development of positive conditionality
within the EC GSP. This will provide a necessary background to the dispute of
EC–Tariff Preferences which examined the permissibility of conditionality
within the GSP.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE GSP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
The previous section examined the positive and negative aspects of con-
ditionality. This section will trace the development of the GSP of the EC and
elucidate upon the emergence of a policy of positive conditionality whereby
additional tariff preferences are granted to developing countries in return
for adherence to certain standards relating to the promotion of ‘sustainable
development’. Particular attention will be paid to the development of
sustainable development within EC law more generally and the role of
environmental protection as one of its key components.
The original GSP of the [then] European Economic Community19 was
instituted in 1971 via the adoption of six regulations covering industrial
products and a separate regulation governing preferential treatment in agri-
cultural goods.20 These regulations administered a scheme of preferential
tariff treatment for developing country products which was set to run for 10
years until 1981.21 From the start, the GSP was depicted as part of a wider
policy of assistance and cooperation between the EEC and the developing
world. Therefore, in contrast to other
countries, both developing and developed, [who] considered the generalized
preferences as no more than limited measures of trade policy, the Community
has always taken the view that they are an instrument for development co-
operation.22
18 S Arnau, The Generalized System of Preferences and the World Trade Organization
(Cameron May, London, 2002) 270.
19 Products covered by the now defunct European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC] were
covered by two separate regulations promulgated by the Council of the European Communities,
see Yusuf, Legal Aspects of Trade Preferences for Developing States (Kluwer, The Hague, 1982)
120.
20 Council Regulations (EEC) [1972] OJ L142/1 et seq. See also the original communication
of the Commission detailing the original ‘offers’ of the GSP scheme of the EEC, Commission des
Communaute´s Europe´ennes, La mise en application de l’offre de la communaute´ en matie`re
de pre´fe´rences ge´ne´ralise´es a octroyer en faveur des exportations d’articles manufactures et des
produits semi-ﬁnis des pays en voie de de´veloppement SEC (71) 1000 (15 Mar 1971).
21 The 1971 temporary GATT waiver which provided for the original imposition of the GSP
was limited in time to ten years from 1971 to 1981, see BISD (n 8). The 10-year time limit of the
original EEC GSP was thus merely a reﬂection of the temporary GATT waiver.
22 Commission Communication on The Future Development of the European Community’s
Generalized Tariff Preferences COM(75)17 ﬁnal (3 Feb 1975).
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Despite the explicit linkage between the GSP and development policy, the
preference scheme of the EEC established from the start an elaborate system
of quantitative import limitations which rather curtailed the value of the
preferential tariff treatment on offer. These limitations took the form primarily
of tariff ceilings and tariff quotas and their operation was such that the
degree of preferential treatment accorded to single products as well as to the
trade of individual beneﬁciaries could vary from year to year. As such, each of
the regulations governing the operation of the GSP was subject to yearly
change and amendment, undermining the capacity of the GSP to provide for
trade expansion given the uncertainty inherent in tariff treatment from year
to year.
The GSP of the European Communities was subsequently reauthorized,
with few changes, in 1981 and was scheduled to run until 1991. A 10-year
review of the operation of the GSP from 1981 to 1991 was originally sched-
uled for 1 January 1991 to revise and update the workings of the GSP.
However, the review was postponed pending the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round, which culminated in the formation of the WTO.23 The GSP was
renewed in 199024 but aside from slight technical changes, no overarching
review was forthcoming until 1994.
In 1994, the EC GSP scheme for industrial products was substantially
amended.25 The amendments made provision for the GSP to apply to a four
year period rather than the one-year application period of previous schemes.
Quantitative limitations on products otherwise eligible for GSP treatment
were removed and replaced with a system of ‘tariff modulation.’ This system
categorized products into four classes of ‘sensitivity’, the sensitivity of a
product being determined by reference to the manufacturing situation for that
same product in the European Community.26 Tariff modulation according to
sensitivity divided products into goods into ‘very-sensitive’, ‘sensitive’,
‘semi-sensitive’, and ‘non-sensitive’ product groupings. With a few excep-
tions, eligible countries received tariff reductions of 15 per cent, 30 per cent,
23 Commission Background Note on the Community’s Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) MEMO/94/35 (2 June 1994).
24 Regulation (EEC) 3831/90 [1990] OJ L 370/1; Regulation [EEC] 3832/90, OJ [1990]
L 370/39; Regulation (EEC) 3833/90 [1990] OJ L 370/86; Regulation (EEC) 3834/90 [1990] OJ
L 370/121; Regulation (EEC) 3835/90 [1990] OJ L 370/126; and Regulation (EEC) 3900/91
[1991] OJ L 368/11.
25 Council Regulation (EC) 3281/94 Applying a Four-year Scheme of Generalized Tariff
Preferences (1995 to 1998) in Respect of Certain Industrial Products Originating in Developing
Countries [1994] OJ L 348/1.
26 European Commission Director General for Trade, ‘User’s Guide to the European Union’s
Scheme of Generalized Tariff Preferences’ (Feb 2003), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
issues/global/gsp/gspguide.htm> (last accessed 28 Jan 2007), note that this Guide has not been
updated and does not deal with the operation of the current GSP scheme. The deﬁnition of
sensitivity is, however, unaffected.
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65 per cent, and 100 per cent, respectively, off MFN tariff duty applicable to
the goods concerned.27
In a 1994 Communication on the ‘role of the GSP: 1995–2004’,28 the
European Commission noted that while the traditional legal basis for the GSP
had been [current] Article 133 EC [ex Article 113 EC] which governs the
common commercial policy, the GSP was really a development tool, and as
such, ‘must be placed at the service of development in the broader sense—
embracing social and environmental concerns . . . ’.29 The Commission thus
proposed the introduction of ‘special incentive’ mechanisms which would
supplement the beneﬁts available under the general GSP scheme and aim to
provide ‘positive inducements and logical components of development policy
in that they reﬂect the idea of social progress and protection of the environ-
ment as aspects of, rather than preconditions for, sustainable development’.30
The Commission proposal put forward the idea of providing additional
margins of preference to developing countries willing to implement certain
social and environmental policies as part of a wider goal to promote sustain-
able development.
The notion of sustainable development is primarily an international
construct, the genesis of which can be traced to the 1972 United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment.31 The results of this Conference
stressed that efforts towards environmental protection could not be
divorced from issues such as economic and social development. In 1992, the
United Nations convened a conference in Rio de Janiero on the environment
and development which reafﬁrmed the principles expounded in 1972
and underscored international commitment to the pursuit of sustainable
development. While the idea of sustainable development has produced a
myriad of deﬁnitions, the best-known attempt to craft a deﬁnition for the
concept is that of the Brundtland Commission Report32 which deﬁned sus-
tainable development as development that ‘meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs’.
The concept of sustainable development has grown and adapted since the
circulation of the Brundtland Commission’s Report and has come to represent
27 Council Regulation (EC) 3281/94 Art 2; Council Regulation (EC) 2820/98 Applying a
Multiannual Scheme of Generalized Tariff Preferences for the Period 1 July 1999 to 31 December
2001 [1998] OJ L 357/1 Art 2.
28 Commission Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, Integration of the Developing Countries into the International Trading System: Role
of the GSP COM(94)212 ﬁnal (1 June 1994).
29 ibid 3. 30 ibid 11.
31 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, ‘Report of the United Conference
on Human Environment’ (June 1972) A/Conf 48/14 and Corr 1, Chap II sect. B; see also United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development’ (June 1992), A/CONF.151/26 (Vol I).
32 Published as Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future (OUP, Oxford, 1987).
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the culmination of a policy triangle embracing trade, the environment
and economic development.33 Thus, advocates of sustainable development
favour
open economic relations and economic growth, because poverty is a prime cause
of environmental degradation, and because economic growth provides greater
resources (and more favourable attitudes) for environmental protection. At the
same time, the basic notion is that economic growth must be sustainable for the
beneﬁt of future generations.34
The ﬁrst formal reference to sustainable development within the Treaties
establishing the EC/EU was introduced by the Treaty on European Union
[TEU] negotiated at Maastricht in 1991, which amended Article 2 EC to
introduce the promotion of ‘sustainable development’ into Community com-
petence. Article B (present Article 2) of the TEU similarly lists the achieve-
ment of ‘balanced and sustainable development’ to be one of the objectives of
the Union. Article 130(r)(2) EC [present Article 174(2)] was also amended at
Maastricht so that the obligation that environmental protection shall be a
‘component’ of other Community policies was transformed into a requirement
that it be integrated into the very ‘deﬁnition and implementation’ of
Community policy. As a result of the momentum for sustainable development
launched at Maastricht, the ﬁfth European Environmental Action Programme
approved in 1993 adopted the concept of sustainable development pronounced
in the Brundtland Report and thereby attempted to lay the groundwork for the
implementation of the concept at Community level.35 The conclusion of the
treaty of Maastricht also introduced for the ﬁrst time an explicit legal basis
for the conclusion of agreements aimed at development cooperation36 and
identiﬁed ‘sustainable economic and social development of [developing
countries] and their gradual integration into the world economy, as priority
objectives.’37
33 S Gaines, ‘International Trade, Environmental Protection and Development as a
Sustainable Development Triangle’ (2002) 11 Review of European Community and International
Environmental Law 259, 261.
34 K Abbot, ‘“Economic” Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving Boundaries of
International Federalism’ (1996–7) 18 Cardozo Law Review 971, 979.
35 Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States, meeting within the Council of 1 February 1993 on a Community programme of policy and
action in relation to the environment and sustainable development—a European Community
programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development
[1993] OJ C138/1, as noted in M O’Neill, ‘Agriculture, the EC and the WTO: A Legal Critical
Analysis of the Concepts of Sustainability and Multifuctionality’ (2002) 4(3) Environmental Law
Review 144, n 26.
36 Title XX [ex XVII] EC, see E Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality
in Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2003) 28.
37 EC Commission Background Note on the European Union’s New Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) Scheme MEMO/95/1 (19 Jan 1995), referring to Art 177 (1) and (2) EC [ex Art
130u].
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While the GSP is currently promulgated on the basis of the common
commercial policy,38 it was iterated above that it has generally been
considered a ‘tool’ with which to assist in the development of developing
countries. The introduction at Maastricht of a link between trade and the
integration of developing countries into the world economy on the one hand,
and sustainable and social development on the other, thus afforded the
Community signiﬁcant political capital to introduce the concept of ‘sustain-
able development’ into the GSP. This is particularly so given that in 1993, the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], an or-
ganization traditionally depicted as the ‘secretariat of the south’ recommended
at its eighth conference in Cartagena the ‘mainstreaming’ of sustainable de-
velopment into policies to foster the growth of developing countries. The
eighth UNCTAD conference noted that sustainable development encompasses
‘such key issues as patterns of economic activity, modes of consumption, the
persistence of poverty, the quality of development and necessary adaptation of
domestic and international economic management’.39 It was recognized that
poverty reduction, strategies to facilitate growth and protection of the environ-
ment were mutually reinforcing policies.40 It was against such a background
that the EC opted to introduce the so-called ‘special incentives arrangements’.
The ‘special incentive arrangements’41 were formally introduced in 1998
and offered an additional margin of preference to developing countries
38 Common Commercial Policy is found in Title IX [ex VII] EC Treaty. The legal basis
for the promulgation of the GSP was the subject of a legal challenge in 1987. The European
Court of Justice [ECJ] in Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493 upheld Art 133
[ex Art 113] EC as the correct legal basis, despite the development objectives of the grant of
preferences.
39 UNCTAD, ‘Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 8th
Session at Cartagena de Indias Colombia’ (1993) UN Doc TD/364/Rev.I para 38.
40 ibid para 63.
41 The establishment of these special incentive arrangements was provided for in Arts 7 and 8
of Council Regulations (EC) 3281/94 and (EC) No 1256/96; however, the introduction of these
arrangements was delayed by the need for a report into the ‘intensity and modalities’ of the
planned scheme which was tasked to be completed by the Commission and presented to the
Council by 1997. The report was completed in June 1997; see Commission Report to the Council
pursuant to Art 7 (2) of Council Regulations 3281/91 and 1256/96 on the scheme of generalized
preferences: Summary of the work conducted within the ILO, OECD and the WTO on the link
between international trade and social standards, COM(97)260 ﬁnal (2 June 1997). Subsequently,
the Commission issued a proposal to activate the special incentive arrangements; see Commission
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) applying the special incentive arrangements concerning
labour rights and environmental protection provided for in Arts 7 and 8 of Council Regulation
(EC) 3281/94 and 1256/96 applying the scheme of generalized tariff preferences in respect of
certain industrial and agricultural products originating in developing countries COM(97)534/4
(29 Oct 1997). The special incentive arrangements were ﬁnally introduced by way of Council
Regulation (EC) No 1154/98 applying the special incentive arrangements concerning labour
rights and environmental protection provided for in Arts 7 and 8 of Regulations (EC) No 3281/94
and (EC) 1256/96 Applying Multiannual Schemes of Generalized Tariff Preferences in Respect of
Certain Industrial and Agricultural Products Originating in Developing Countries [1998] OJ
L 160/1. This Regulation was set to expire on the date of expiry of Regulations (EC) 3281/94 and
(EC) 1256/96. Regulation (EC) 3281/94 was set to expire on 31 December 1998 but was extended
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determined by the European Community to be in compliance with
certain labour and environmental policy standards.42 The condition relating
to environmental protection mandated eligibility seeking countries to ‘effec-
tively apply’ the standards of the International Tropical Timber Organization
relating to the sustainable management of tropical forests. Paralleling the in-
troduction of the special incentives arrangements was the incremental creation
of a ‘development acquis’ within European policy.43 Environmental pro-
tection was central to this development acquis and manifested itself in
the institution of a Council Regulation promoting the full integration of
the environmental dimension in the development process of developing
countries.44 An aspect of this environmental dimension was a concern for
the sustainable management and conservation of tropical forests,45 hence its
inclusion within the special incentive arrangements of the EC GSP.
The special incentive arrangements were subsequently incorporated into
a new Council Regulation EC 2820/98 applying a multiannual scheme of
generalized tariff preferences from 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001.46 The
separate preference schemes relating to agricultural products and industrial
products were also merged by this Regulation.47 The GSP scheme of the
European Communities was amended and updated in 2001 by Regulation
2501/200148 and scheduled to run from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004.
This Regulation formed the basis of a dispute between India and the European
Communities and it is to this dispute that we turn to elucidate upon the
particular legal requirements of the grant of preferences.
IV. THE DISPUTE OF EC–TARIFF PREFERENCES
The previous section considered the incremental development of environ-
mental conditionality and its intrinsic linkage to sustainable development
until 30 June 1999 by Council Regulation EC 2820/98. Applying a Multiannual Scheme of
Generalized Tariff Preferences from 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001 [1998] OJ L 357/1.
42 Council Regulation (EC) 1154/98 Arts 8–21.
43 E Morgera and G Duran, ‘Enlargement and EU Development Policy: An Environmental
Perspective’ (2004) 13 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law
152, 154.
44 EC Regulation 2493/2000 of 7 November 2000 on measures to promote the full integration
of the environmental dimension in the development process of developing countries [2000]
OJ L288/1.
45 EC Regulation 2494/2000 of 7 November 2000 on measures to promote the conservation
and sustainable management of tropical forests and other forests in developing countries [2000]
OJ L288/6.
46 Council Regulation (EC) 2820/98 Arts 8–21.
47 The agricultural and industrial schemes were merged for reasons of simplicity and to make
the GSP easier to use, see Commission Proposal for a Council (EC) Regulation applying a scheme
of generalized tariff preferences for the period of 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2001
COM(98)521 (16 Sept 1999) 2.
48 Council Regulation (EC) 2501/2001 Applying a Scheme of Generalized Tariff Preferences
for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 [2001] OJ L 346/1.
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within the GSP scheme of the European Communities. This section shall
elaborate upon the WTO dispute of EC–Tariff Preferences and will examine
the legislative and political background to the dispute as well as offer a
detailed analysis of the ﬁndings of the Appellate Body.
A. Background to the Dispute
The WTO GSP dispute between India and the European Communities
centred upon the granting of additional tariff preferences to certain
developing countries to assist them in their ﬁght against drug trafﬁcking and
production. The disputed ‘drug arrangements’ were one of ﬁve tariff
preference schemes available to developing countries under EC Council
Regulation 2501/2001:49
(i) The General Arrangements;
(ii) Special Incentive Arrangements for the protection of labour rights;
(iii) Special Incentive Arrangements for the protection of the environment;
(iv) Special Arrangements for the least developed countries; and
(v) Special Arrangements to combat drug production and trafﬁcking (the
‘Drug Arrangements’).
India was a recipient of tariff preferences under the General Arrangements. Of
the four remaining arrangements under the EC GSP scheme, each scheme
offered separate eligibility requirements and differed with respect to the
extent of tariff reductions offered, product coverage and the conditions upon
which tariff preferences could be reduced or removed. While India had
initially indicated concern with the special incentive schemes for protection
of the environment and labour rights, it ultimately limited the scope of its
complaint to the Drug Arrangements, while reserving the right to bring some
future complaint regarding the environmental and labour special incentive
schemes.50
The nature of the Drug Arrangements was such as to limit the offer of
additional preferences to a closed list of twelve countries; Bolivia, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pakistan,
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The so-called ‘preferred’ list of 12 received
tariff preferences over and above those offered to recipients under the General
Arrangements.
The difference between the preferences granted under the Drug
Arrangements and those under the General Arrangements related to both the
depth of the tariff cut offered as well as the products covered under each
scheme. With regard to the tariff cut available, the Drug Arrangements offered
49 Council Regulation (EC) 2501/2001.
50 Panel Report, European Communities: Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R, adopted 202004 para 1.4 (hereinafter, EC–Tariff
Preferences Panel).
Environmental Protection and The Generalized System of Preferences 123
duty-free treatment to products referred to in Annex IV and subject to
ad valorem duties, or a reduction of duty to a rate of 3.6 per cent. Products
subject to speciﬁc duties were entitled under the Drug Arrangements to either
duty free treatment or, at most, the levying of a duty limited to 16 per cent
of the customs value. In relation to products covered by both the General
Arrangements and the Drug Arrangements and listed as ‘sensitive’51 under
column G of Annex IV to the Regulation, the 12 preferred countries were
granted duty-free treatment while products originating from beneﬁciaries
of the General Arrangements were merely entitled to a tariff reduction. In
relation to the product coverage of each scheme, Column D of Annex IV
of the Council Regulation details the products covered under the Drug
Arrangements. The list of products covered under the Drug Arrangements is
more extensive than applicable under the General Arrangements. Thus, for
products included under the Drug Arrangements but not under the General
Arrangements, the preferred 12 received duty-free treatment while countries
eligible under the General Arrangements were subject to the full duties
payable under the Common Customs Tariff.52
The argument set out by India in the dispute contained two main elements;
1. The Drug Arrangements instituted by the European Communities were
inconsistent with Article 1.1 of GATT 1994.
2. Drug Arrangements could not be justiﬁed by reference to the Enabling
Clause.53
As noted above, the recipients of ‘Drug Arrangements’ were primarily Latin
American countries of the Andean and Central American region. After the
events of 11 September 2001, however, Pakistan was also added to the list of
countries eligible to receive additional tariff preferences under the Drug
Arrangements of the European Communities’ GSP. While Pakistan certainly
was and indeed still is afﬂicted by signiﬁcant problems relating to the
production and trafﬁcking of drugs through its territory, it would appear
that the primary motivation behind the advancement of additional tariff
preferences to Pakistan under the EC’s special incentive arrangements to
combat drugs was to secure its acquiescence and support in the invasion of
Afghanistan and, more broadly, the ‘war on terror’.54 An EU memo on the
issue states that:
In recognition of Pakistan’s changed position on the Taliban regime and its
determination to return to democratic rule in 2002, the Commission has stepped
51 With the exception of products listed in CN codes 0306 13, 1704 10 91 and 1704 10 99.
52 EC–Tariff Preferences Panel paras 2.7–2.8.
53 ibid para 3.1.
54 Use of the GSP as a response to terrorism is not unprecedented; for example, the United
States GSP contains a clause to the effect that eligibility would be denied to any country that
purported to ‘aid or abet, by granting sanctuary from prosecution, any individual or group that has
committed an act of international terrorism’, 19 USC 2462(b)(2).
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up the EU’s assistance to Pakistan (up to E100 million in 2001/2002). A new
Co-operation Agreement was signed at the occasion of the visit of President
Prodi and PM Verhofstadt to Pakistan on the 24 November 2001, where they also
met up with President Musharraf. On 16 October, The Commission presented a
package of trade measures designed to signiﬁcantly improve access for Pakistani
exports to the EU . . . In return, Pakistan will improve access to its markets for
EU clothing and textile exporters. The package gives Pakistan the best possible
access to the EU short of a Free Trade Agreement by making it eligible for the
new Special Generalized System of Preferences Scheme for countries combating
drugs.55
India was naturally concerned at the prospect of concessions estimated to
be worth around E150 million a year (through the elimination of duties)56
being granted to its nearest rival. India’s claim in EC–Tariff Preferences
thus centred upon the inclusion of Pakistan within the EC’s special incentive
arrangements to combat drugs and the very real possibility of trade diversion
which accompanied it.
While the dispute of EC–Tariff Preferences did not inquire into the ‘history’
of the Drug Arrangements under the GSP scheme of the European
Communities, an investigation of the chronological development of the link
between tariff preferences and a desire to combat the problem of drugs re-
veals that until the events of 11 September 2001, the Drug Arrangements
were intended to beneﬁt a closed list of Latin American countries. Indeed,
the historical development of the Drug Arrangements can be traced to
12 November 1985 when a Cooperation Agreement between the European
Economic Community, on the one part, and the countries party to the General
Treaty on Central American Economic Integration (Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and Panama was signed.57 In 1990, the
European Commission produced a proposal for a regulation to extend to
Bolivia, Colombia and Peru the more favourable tariff treatment58 as one part
55 EU Response to 11 September: European commission action, MEMO 02/122 (3 June 2002)
<http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/02/122&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (last accessed 25 Feb 2006), see also Commission
of the European Communities, Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation applying a scheme
of generalized tariff preferences for the period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004
COM(2001)688 ﬁnal (14 Nov 2001).
56 BRIDGES/ICTSD, ‘WTO Appellate Body: Differentiation Possible Under Preference
Schemes’ (22 Apr 2004) <http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-04-22/story4.htm> (last accessed
25 Feb 2007).
57 Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community, of the one part, and
the countries parties to the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration (Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) and Panama, of the other part—
Declarations by the Community—Exchange of Letters [1986] OJ L 172/2.
58 Commission Proposal to the Council for a Regulation extending to Bolivia, Colombia
and Peru the generalized tariff preferences applied to certain products originating in the least-
developed countries and amending Regulations (EEC) Nos 3896/89, 3897/89 and 3898/89
COM(90)254 ﬁnal (18 Dec 1989).
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of a three-point plan designed to assist in the battle against drugs production
and trafﬁcking being fought in the Andean producer countries of Bolivia,
Colombia and Peru. The other two features of the assistance plan took the
form of increased ﬁnancial support and better coordination of aid.59 A Council
Regulation of December 1990 subsequently granted Bolivia, Colombia, Peru
and Ecuador an exemption on quantitative limitations on industrial and textile
products as well as duty-free treatment on these items and duty-free treatment
on a speciﬁed list of agricultural products.60
In 1991, similar efforts were made to improve the economic situation of the
Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and Nicaragua as well as Panama. While these six countries were held to be
not as badly affected by the problem of drugs as the Andean countries, the
Commission noted three factors which made it vital for the Community to
provide practical support to Central America. The Commission thereby listed
the fragile peace process throughout the region occurring against a volatile
social and political background, the historical political and social links
between the Community and the region and ﬁnally the need to prevent the
problem of drugs spreading beyond the area.61 In a Council Regulation of
16 December 1991, Common Customs Tariff duties for a majority of the
agricultural products covered by Regulation 3833/90/EEC were suspended
for each respective country until 31 December 1992.62 In the 1994
Communication from the Commission on the role of the GSP from
1995–2004,63 it was noted that the so-called Drug Arrangements applicable to
the Andean and Central American countries should continue ‘provided the
countries concerned for their part continue their efforts to combat drugs and
some results are achieved’.64
The Drug Arrangements were subsequently renewed by Regulation 2820/
98/EC and Regulation 2501/2001. The latter regulation made an explicit link
between social and environmental protection and additional preferences under
59 European Parliament Session Documents, Report of the Committee on Development and
Cooperation on the Commission Proposal to the Council for a Regulation extending to Bolivia,
Colombia and Peru the generalized tariff preferences applied to certain products originating in the
least-developed countries and amending Regulations (EEC) Nos 3896/89, 3897/89, and 3898/89
of 18 December 1989 COM(90)254, A3-0225/90 (24 Sept 1990).
60 Council Regulation (EEC) 3835/90 Amending Regulations (EEC) 3831/90, (EEC) 3832/90
and (EEC) 3833/90 In Respect of the System of Generalized Tariff Preferences Applied to Certain
Products originating in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru [1990] OJ L 370/ 126.
61 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) amending Council
Regulation 3833/90 in respect of the system of generalized tariff preferences applied to certain
products originating in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama,
SEC (91) 1109 (9 July 1991).
62 Council Regulation (EEC) 3900/91 Suspending Common Customs Tariff duties for pro-
ducts covered by Regulation (EEC) No 3833/90 and originating in Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama [1991] OJ L 368/11 Art 1.
63 ibid 12. 64 ibid 13.
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the Drug Arrangements. Thus, Article 25 of Regulation 2501/2001 established
a requirement to the effect that the Commission
shall also assess each beneﬁciary country’s [under the Drug Arrangements]
(a) social development, in particular the respect and promotion of the standards
laid down in the ILO Conventions referred to in the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, [and] (b) environmental policy, in
particular the sustainable management of tropical forests.
Before the entry into force of the updated Drug Regulations contained in
Regulation 2501/2001, the Commission became concerned that the Enabling
Clause may not provide the necessary legal cover to ensure the compatibility
of the arrangements with WTO rules. The concern related to the fact that
the Arrangements were only available to a ‘closed’ list of countries. In 2001,
the Communities applied to the WTO for a waiver to provide legal security to
the Arrangements. The request recognized that ‘because the special arrange-
ments are only available to imports originating in those [limited] members, a
waiver from the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I of GATT 1994 appears
necessary before they can effectively enter into force for reasons of legal
certainty’.65 The Communities failed to secure this waiver but opted to go and
ahead and continue with the grant of additional preferences under the Drug
Arrangements. The continuance of the grant of preferences was to result in
India contesting the terms of the Communities GSP within the WTO dispute
settlement system.
India contended that the Enabling Clause did not absolve the European
Communities from its obligation to grant MFN treatment to developing
country products66 and argued that with the exception of special treatment
accorded to the least developed members, the Enabling Clause could only
justify preferences that were ‘non-discriminatory preferences beneﬁcial to the
developing countries’ (emphasis added).67 The use of the deﬁnitive article
‘the’ was held by India to be conclusive proof of the requirement that GSP
schemes must beneﬁt all developing countries.68
While recognizing that the Enabling Clause did not oblige any developed
country to provide a scheme of preferences, India argued that it did mandate
that a Member who chose to institute a preference scheme must abide
by the framework for preferences described within the 1971 waiver. Any
preference scheme must therefore be ‘generalized, non-reciprocal and
non-discriminatory’. Non-discriminatory was to be understood in its ordinary
context. To discriminate was therefore held to equate to the act of
65 Request for a WTO Waiver—New EC Special Tariff Arrangements to Combat Drug
Production and Trafﬁcking, 24 Oct 2001 (G/C/W/328) as cited in Panel Report, European
Communities–Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/
DS246/R, adopted 202004, modiﬁed by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS/246/AB/R, 9.
66 ibid para 4.30. 67 ibid para 4.35.
68 ibid.
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making a ‘distinction in the treatment of different categories or people or
things’.69 Since the Drug Arrangements clearly made a distinction between
two categories of developing countries, India argued that the European
Communities had clearly breached the terms of Article 1.1 of GATT 1994 and
could not avail of the Enabling Clause as an afﬁrmative defence since the
Enabling Clause does not absolve Members from according MFN treatment to
products originating in developing countries.70
The European Communities argued that the Enabling Clause excludes the
applicability of Article 1.1 of the GATT 199471 and so does not act as an
‘afﬁrmative defence’ with which to justify violation. Instead, the European
Communities described the Enabling Clause as a ‘self standing regime’ which
conferred a permanent right to grant certain types of more favourable and
differential treatment to developing countries, ‘notwithstanding’ Article 1.1 of
GATT 1994.72 Therefore, the European Communities contended that not only
did it not bear the burden of proof with respect to defending the Drug
Arrangements, but rather India, as the complaining party, was required to
establish the inconsistency of the Drug Arrangements with the Enabling
Clause.73
The European Communities also argued that the term ‘developing
countries’ contained in paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause did not impose
an obligation to grant ‘differential and more favourable treatment’ to all
developing countries on an MFN basis.74 In a related point, the European
Communities contended that the term ‘non-discriminatory’ contained in
footnote 3 to the Enabling Clause does not mandate that all developing
countries be treated in an identical fashion75 but rather requires that equal
situations are treated equally while unequal situations are treated differently.76
Any distinction made between countries should therefore pursue a legitimate
aim and there should be sufﬁcient nexus between the objective pursued
and any distinction made.77 It follows that treating differently developing
countries that are particularly affected by the problem of drugs is not ‘dis-
criminatory’.78 The Drug Arrangements were designed to respond to the
gravity of the drug problem of each beneﬁciary under the scheme79 and were
determined by the European Communities to be consistent with paragraph
3(c) of the Enabling Clause which refers to the ‘development, ﬁnancial and
trade needs of developing countries’ which are individual to each country.80
Since need varies between developing countries and between categories of
developing countries, trade preferences such as those available under the Drug
Arrangements constitute an appropriate response to the developmental needs
of those countries particularly affected by the problem of drugs.
69 ibid para 4.33. 70 ibid para 4.22.
71 ibid para 4.42. 72 ibid. 73 ibid para 4.44.
74 ibid para 4.44(i). 75 ibid para 4.47.
76 ibid para 4.65. 77 ibid. 78 ibid para 4.70.
79 ibid para 4.75. 80 ibid para 4.66.
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A WTO dispute settlement Panel established to hear the dispute subse-
quently upheld India’s complaint.81 The Communities appealed the ﬁnding
and the matter was passed to the WTO Appellate Body for its consideration.
B. Appellate Body Analysis
The Appellate Body started its analysis by looking at the relationship between
Article 1.1 and the Enabling Clause and held that the Enabling Clause op-
erates as an ‘exception’ to Article GATT I.1.82 The Appellate Body then
considered whether the Enabling Clause could be used to justify the GSP
scheme of the European Communities. It found that the phrase ‘non-
discriminatory’ in footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause did not
prohibit the granting of different tariff preferences to products originating
from GSP beneﬁciaries. It held that differentiation between developing
country recipients under a GSP scheme was therefore permissible.83 The
reasoning employed by the Appellate Body to support its reading of paragraph
2(a) and footnote 3 to the Enabling Clause related to the fact that ‘paragraph
2(a), on its face, does not explicitly authorize or prohibit the granting of
different tariff preferences to different GSP beneﬁciaries’. However, it added
the proviso that any differentiation would only be acceptable and accord to the
ordinary meaning of the term ‘non-discriminatory’ if identical treatment was
available to all similarly situated GSP beneﬁciaries.84
On the facts of the dispute, the Appellate Body found that the Drug
Arrangements instituted by the European Communities were discriminatory in
that its 12 beneﬁciaries constituted a ‘closed list’.85 If the aim of the Drug
Arrangements scheme was to respond to the ‘need’ of certain GSP beneﬁci-
aries with respect to the problem of illicit drug production and trafﬁcking,86
the Drug Arrangements would have had to have been available to all de-
veloping countries similarly affected by the problem of drugs in order to
satisfy the conditions of non-discrimination.87 Since adding to the list of
beneﬁciaries entitled under the Drug Arrangements would have required an
amendment to the Regulation,88 this was clearly not the case. The lack of
transparency with which the European Communities operated the Drug
Arrangements was also noted by the Appellate Body in respect of the fact
that the Regulation did not seek to set any standards or criteria that must be
fulﬁlled in order to qualify for inclusion under the Drug Arrangements.89 The
81 ibid paras 8.1–8.4.
82 Appellate Body Report European Communities–Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS/246/AB/R adopted 20 April 2004 para 36 (here-
inafter EC–Tariff Preferences Appellate).
83 ibid para 173. 84 ibid. 85 ibid para 187.
86 ibid para 179. 87 ibid para 188.
88 ibid para 185. 89 ibid para 188.
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Appellate Body therefore held that ‘although the European Communities
claim that the Drug Arrangements are available to all developing countries
that are ‘similarly affected by the drug problem’, because the Regulation does
not deﬁne the criteria or standards that a developing country must meet to
qualify for preferences under the Drug Arrangements, there is no basis to
determine whether those criteria or standards are discriminatory or not. For
these reasons, we ﬁnd that the European Community has failed to prove that
the Drug Arrangements meet the requirement in footnote 3 that they be ‘non-
discriminatory’.90 The European Communities had therefore failed to justify
the Drug Arrangements.
V. CHECKLIST FOR MEASURES OF DIFFERENTIATION
The previous section elaborated on the terms of the dispute of EC–Tariff
Preferences. Based on relevant ﬁndings of this dispute, this author has con-
structed a ‘checklist’ of the considerations which the Appellate Body will
likely bear in mind in assessing any future WTO challenge to measures GSP
conditionality. This checklist will be utilized to assess the WTO conformity of
the current EC GSP91 which was promulgated in the wake of the judgment of
EC–Tariff Preferences. Particular reference will be had to measures of con-
ditionality which seek to ensure environmental protection.
Any differentiation between developing countries must be available to
all ‘similarly situated’ countries.92 The primary focus of the Appellate
Body’s judgment related to the proper interpretation to be ascribed to ‘non-
discriminatory.’ While the original Panel hearing of the dispute held that the
term ‘non-discriminatory’ imposed an obligation upon GSP donor states to
offer identical tariff treatment to all beneﬁciary developing countries (with the
exception of the least developed), the Appellate Body reversed this by stating
that discrimination did not arise in circumstances were identical tariff
preferences were granted to all ‘similarly situated’ countries. The reading
accorded to ‘similarly situated’ by the Appellate Body stated that precedence
was not to be accorded to any historical, cultural or special ties between the
beneﬁciary and granting state. As such, the Appellate Body recognized that
‘one of the objectives of the 1971 Waiver Decision and the Enabling Clause
was to eliminate the fragmented system of special preferences that were, in
general, based on historical and political ties between developed countries
and their former colonies’.93 Accordingly, the linking of preferences to any
‘special’ relationship between parties would likely be incompatible with the
90 ibid paras 187–8.
91 Council Regulation (EC) 980/2005 Applying a Scheme of Generalized Tariff Preferences
[2005] OJ L 169/1.
92 EC–Tariff Preferences Appellate para 173.
93 ibid para 155.
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judgment of the Appellate Body under EC–Tariff Preferences and would re-
quire a waiver to GATT Article 1. In relation, the Appellate Body speciﬁcally
noted the provision in the footnote to paragraph 2 of the Enabling Clause to
the effect that
it would remain open for CONTRACTING PARTIES to consider on an ad hoc basis
under the GATT provisions for joint action any proposals for differential and
more favourable treatment not falling within the scope of this paragraph.
Any differentiation must be enacted as a positive response to ‘need’. The
Appellate Body stated that any differentiation between GSP beneﬁciaries
must respond positively to the ‘needs of developing countries.’94 The phrase
‘respond positively’ is derived from the paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause
which mandates that treatment provided under the Enabling Clause ‘shall in
the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to de-
veloping countries be designed and, if necessary, modiﬁed, to respond posi-
tively to the development, ﬁnancial and trade needs if developing countries’
(emphasis added). In examining the context for the term ‘non-discriminatory’,
the Appellate Body95 looked to paragraph 3 (c) of the Enabling Clause
and noted that the use of the word ‘shall’ is indicative of an obligation for
developed countries providing preferential treatment under a GSP scheme to
respond positively to the needs of developing countries.96 The Appellate Body
adopted the OED meaning of the word and as such, ‘“positive” is deﬁned as
“considering in or characterized by constructive action or attitudes (emphasis
added).”’97
The type of need to which a differential response would be appropriate
is ‘limited to the “development, ﬁnancial and trade needs.”’98 The
Appellate Body looked to the nature of the ‘development, ﬁnancial and trade
needs’ identiﬁed by the preference granting state and made note of the fact
that developing countries may have ‘development, ﬁnancial and trade needs’
that are subject to change.99 The changing nature and indeed understanding of
such needs is best reﬂected with an examination of the concept of ‘develop-
ment’ which was initially understood within the GSP as relating to economic
development. Accordingly, if we look to the aims of the GSP as elucidated
upon within Resolution 21(II) of second UNCTAD conference in New
Delhi,100 then we discover that the rationale of preferences was primarily
economic in that the GSP was tasked to increase export earnings, promote
industrialization and promote economic development. However, the under-
standing given to development in EC–Tariff Preferences appears to move
94 ibid para 157. 95 ibid para 158.
96 ibid para. 97 ibid para 164. 98 ibid para 163.
99 ibid para 160.
100 Resolution 21 (II), in, Final Act and Report of UNCTAD II, Annex 1 (United Nations
New York 1968).
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away from such a narrow understanding of development as equivalent
to economic development, according an evolutionary understanding to the
concept of development in that ‘it is simply unrealistic to assume that such
development will be in lockstep for all developing countries at once, now and
for the future.’101
The existence of a relevant need must be capable of objective assess-
ment. The existence of a relevant developmental, ﬁnancial or trade need will
not be taken at face value. Rather, the particular trade need must be assessed
according to an objective and not subjective standard. ‘Broad-based recog-
nition of a particular need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral
instruments adopted by international organizations can act as this standard’
(emphasis added).102 The reference to multilateral instruments arguably con-
curs with the Appellate Body’s evolutionary approach to designate ‘need’ as
recognizing that non-WTO agreements can provide the necessary reference to
identifying a relevant ‘need’.
There must be a ‘nexus’ between the need identiﬁed and the imposition
of differential tariff treatment. The Appellate Body suggests that a ‘suf-
ﬁcient nexus should exist between, on the one hand, the preferential treatment
provided under the respective measure . . . and, on the other hand the likeli-
hood of alleviating the relevant “development, ﬁnancial [or] trade need.”’103
The particular measure at issue must therefore be ‘such that it can be effec-
tively addressed through tariff preferences’104 (emphasis added). The use
of the word ‘can’ indicates the test to be applied is whether the measure is
capable, in an objective sense, of responding to the recognized need.
However, it should be noted that in its assessment of the Drug Arrangements,
the Appellate Body criticized the lack of an ‘indication as to how the
European Communities would assess whether the Drug Arrangements provide
an “adequate and proportionate response” to the needs of developing countries
suffering from the drug problem’.105 There must therefore be some sort of
evaluative mechanism to satisfy the requirement of ‘sufﬁcient nexus’ between
the recognized need and the differential treatment. The mandated GSP
measure must therefore include:
Clear prerequisites or ‘objective’ criteria available that would allow
other developing countries to be included as beneﬁciaries of differential
tariff treatment.106
The grant of tariff treatment ‘to the varying needs of developing countries
[should] not impose unjustiﬁable burdens on other Members . . . this
requirement applies, a fortiori, to any preferential treatment granted to one
GSP beneﬁciary that is not granted to another’.107
101 EC–Tariff Preferences Appellate para 160.
102 ibid para 163. 103 ibid para 164. 104 ibid.
105 ibid para 183. 106 ibid. 107 ibid para 167.
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A. Scrutinizing the new GSP of the EC
The previous section considered the Appellate Body judgment in EC–Tariff
Preferences and elaborated a ‘checklist’ of considerations likely to be borne in
mind with respect to any future challenge to the WTO legality of conditional
tariff preferences. Following a brief exposition of the procedural and sub-
stantive workings of the current GSP Regulation of the EC, this section will
assess its compatibility with WTO rules as well as provide a brief commentary
upon the appropriateness of the legal interpretation provided by the Appellate
Body in EC–Tariff Preferences. It will be contended that the current GSP
Regulation may not necessarily be compatible with the ﬁndings of the
Appellate Body. It will also be argued that the Appellate Body’s ‘checklist’
provides the donor country with considerable autonomy to designate ‘need’,
thereby undermining the ability of developing states to assess and participate
in efforts to determine their own needs.
Following the results of the WTO dispute, the European Commission pre-
sented a draft proposal for a new Council Regulation applying a scheme of
tariff preferences.108 The contents of this proposal were subsequently adopted
in the new GSP Regulation 980/2005.109 Authorising the grant of preferential
tariffs until 31 December 2008, the new Regulation introduces three different
‘arrangements’ governing the grant of preferences. There is the ‘general
arrangement’, the ‘special incentive arrangement for sustainable development
and good governance’ and ‘special arrangement for least-developed countries
[LDC]’.
All GSP beneﬁciaries are eligible to receive the tariff preferences available
under the ‘general arrangements’. Customs tariff duties for non-agricultural
goods marked as ‘non-sensitive’ are entirely suspended while ad valorem
duties on goods marked as ‘sensitive’ are reduced by 3.5 percentage points.
Speciﬁc duties applicable to sensitive goods are reduced by 30 per cent. If a
sensitive good is subject to a combination of ad valorem and speciﬁc duties,
only the ad valorem duty is subject to a reduction.110
The ‘special arrangement for least-developed countries’ provides duty-free
treatment to the overwhelming majority of goods from LDCs. One group of
products excluded from duty-free access is arms and ammunitions. Hence, the
arrangement has come to be known as the ‘Everything but Arms’ [EBA]
initiative. In addition, the Community market for rice and sugar is not yet fully
liberalized. For these goods, incremental tariff reductions are offered with a
view to full institution of duty-free treatment in 2009.
108 Commission Proposal for Council Regulation Applying a Scheme of Generalized Tariff
Preferences COM(2004)699 (20 Oct 2004).
109 Council Regulation (EC) 980/2005 Applying a Scheme of Generalized Tariff Preferences
[2005] OJ L 169/1. 110 ibid Art 7.
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The ‘special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and
good governance’ allows for the suspension of Common Customs Tariff
duties for all products listed in Annex II originating from beneﬁciaries of
the ‘special incentive’ scheme. Speciﬁc duties on these products are sus-
pended except for products for which the Common Customs Tariff duties also
include ad valorem duties. A list of products excluded from the scope of the
special incentive arrangements are listed in Column C of Annex 1 to the
proposal. At the time of the Regulation’s publication, no beneﬁciary state
under this arrangement had any excluded products listed in Column C to
Annex 1.
Eligibility for the special incentive arrangements is deﬁned in the GSP
regulation by reference to a number of criteria with two major hurdles to
eligibility being of note. The ﬁrst hurdle relates to ratiﬁcation in that a country
must have ratiﬁed and effectively implemented all the conventions relating to
human rights and labour rights listed in Part ‘A’ of Annex III. Sixteen con-
ventions are listed in total:
Part A of Annex III
Core Human/Labour Rights UN/ILO Conventions
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women
5. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
6. Convention on the Rights of the Child
7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide
8. Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
(No 138)
9. Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (No 182)
10. Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No 105)
11. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No 29)
12. Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women
Workers for Work of Equal Value (No 100)
13. Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation (No 111)
14. Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize (No 87)
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15. Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to
Organize and to Bargain Collectively (No 98)
16. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid.
In addition, a country must ratify and effectively implement at least seven
(out of a total of 11) of the Conventions relating to ‘the environment and
governance’ listed in Part B of Annex III:111
Part B of Annex III
Conventions Related to the Environment and Governance Principle
17. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
18. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
19. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
20. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora
21. Convention on Biological Diversity
22. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
23. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change
24. United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961)
25. United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)
26. United Nations Convention against Illicit Trafﬁc in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (1988)
27. United Nations Convention against Corruption (Mexico)
The second hurdle listed in the GSP Regulation relates to the requirement that
an eligibility seeking country should be ‘vulnerable’. A vulnerable country is
deﬁned in Article 9 (3) to the Regulation as a country that ‘is not classiﬁed by
the World Bank as a high income country during three consecutive years, and
whose ﬁve sections of its GSP-covered imports to the Community represent
more than 75 per cent of its total GSP-covered imports’ and ‘whose GSP-
covered imports to the Community represent less than 1% in value of total
GSP-covered imports into the Community’.112
Bearing in mind the ﬁndings of the Appellate Body in EC–Tariff
Preferences, this paper shall examine the requirements posed by the special
incentive requirements for environmental protection (Part B of Annex III
above) in order to make an assessment as to the legality of the provisions.
1. Any differentiation between developing countries must be available to
all ‘similarly situated’ countries with clear prerequisites or ‘objective’
111 ibid Art 9. 112 ibid Arts 9–11.
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criteria available that would allow other developing countries to be
included as beneﬁciaries of differential tariff treatment
As iterated above, the ‘closed’ list approach taken by the Communities in
extending the ‘beneﬁts’ of the Drug Arrangements to Pakistan was parti-
cularly criticized by the Appellate Body in EC–Tariff Preferences. No criteria
existed whereby countries ‘similarly situated’ in terms of suffering similar
problems relating to drug trafﬁcking and production could beneﬁt from the
Drugs Arrangements with eligibility simply being decided a priori the
promulgation of the relevant Regulations.
The ‘similarly situated’ requirement exists to ensure ‘non-discrimination’
in that ‘distinguishing among similarly situated beneﬁciaries is discrimi-
natory’.113 In EC–Tariff Preferences, the Appellate Body articulated the need
for a transparent set of objective criteria that would allow all similarly situated
countries to be added to the list of recipient states. This requirement thus
outlaws de jure discrimination whereby a distinction is made between the
goods of two countries on the basis of their country of origin.114 The new GSP
Regulation appears to take this need for clear and objective criteria on board in
its promulgation of a number of requirements applicable to developing
countries seeking eligibility status:
(a) The eligibility requirement; the new GSP Regulation is a marked im-
provement in that it offers a transparent procedure whereby all similarly
situated developing countries may beneﬁt from additional tariff pre-
ferences with ‘eligibility’ being deﬁned by reference to the two hurdles of
‘vulnerability’ and ‘ratiﬁcation’.
(b) The procedural requirement; Article 10 of the GSP Regulation
provides a clear procedural system for the submission of requests by
developing countries seeking to beneﬁt from the special incentive
arrangements
(c) The examination requirement; Article 11 of the GSP Regulation lists a set
of steps which will be entered into in the examination of any request for
additional tariff treatment.
The above requirements thus provide for a facially equal system, applicable to
all developing countries seeking eligibility status. However, one point of note
is that the conditions listed in the new Regulation may have a greater impact
on some countries than others. While the focus of this article is on the
environmental and provisions of the special incentive arrangement, it is
notable that the conditions relating to ‘core human and labour rights’ (Part A
of Annex III) have a disparate impact across the original countries listed
as beneﬁciaries under the Regulation [as originally published]. Of the
113 EC–Tariff Preferences Appellate para 153.
114 M Trebilcock and R Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (Routledge, London
and New York, 2005) 72.
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14 countries listed in the Annex I of the Regulation as beneﬁciaries under the
special incentive arrangements, only ﬁve countries have recently [from 2005]
ratiﬁed any of the listed UN/ILO conventions; Georgia,115 Guatemala,116
Moldova,117 Mongolia,118 and El Salvador,119 with the remaining nine
countries having ratiﬁed the rest of the conventions many years previously.
The ‘burden’ of ratiﬁcation is thus unequally spread.
For all similarly situated countries to be able to avail of differential
favourable tariff treatment elicited as a response to a particular ‘need’, all
such countries should be able to adhere to the enunciated requirements. Thus,
implicit in the pronouncements of the Appellate Body is a requirement that
all similarly situated countries should have the capacity to adhere to the
conditions imposed. The Appellate Body notes that
paragraph 3 (a) of the Enabling Clause to the effect that any ‘differential
and more favourable treatment . . . shall be designed to facilitate and promote
the trade of developing countries and not to raise barriers to or create undue
difﬁculties to the trade of any other contracting parties’ . . . requires that any
positive response . . . to the varying needs of developing countries not impose
unjustiﬁable burdens of other Members.120
It is contended that for all similarly situated countries to avail of differential
tariff treatment, any requirement invoked by the donor State should not be
‘unjustiﬁably burdensome’.
The requirement that any measure of differentiation should not be un-
justiﬁably burdensome so that all similarly situated countries are able to avail
of the measure arguably accords to a de facto reading of the requirement
of non-discrimination. De facto discrimination121 results when a measure is
applicable to all countries but has a disparate impact upon certain States. The
standard of de facto discrimination has been applied by the Appellate Body in
its articulation of the precise meaning of Article II of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services [GATS] which establishes a most-favoured-nation
115 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid ratiﬁed 21 March 2005, see<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty8_asp.htm>
(last accessed 25 Feb 2007). 116 ibid ratiﬁed 15 June 2005.
117 ibid ratiﬁed 28 October 2005.
118 Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No 138),
Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No 105) and Convention concerning
Forced or Compulsory Labour (No 29) ratiﬁed 15 March 2005, see <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
english/newratframeE.htm> (last accessed 25 Feb 2007).
119 Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
(No 87) and Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize
and to Bargain Collectively (No 98) ratiﬁed 6 September 2006, see <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
english/newratframeE.htm> (last accessed 25 Feb 2007).
120 EC–Tariff Preferences Appellate para 167.
121 See Ehring, ‘De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law’ (2002) 36 (5) Journal of World
Trade 921 which argues that differential treatment between imports may be suitable grounds.
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standard in relation to trade in services. In EC–Bananas III, the Appellate
Body noted that
[t]he obligation imposed by Article II is unqualiﬁed. The ordinary meaning of
this provision does not exclude de facto discrimination. Moreover, if Article II
was not applicable to de facto discrimination it would not be difﬁcult . . . to
devise discriminatory measures aimed at circumventing the basic purpose of that
Article.122
The pronouncements of the Appellate Body in EC–Bananas III are arguably
applicable here in that a system of preferences which imposes conditions of
disparate impact could ‘easily circumvent the basic purpose’ of the GSP. This
is due to the fact that the ‘generalized’ system of preferences was introduced
to end ‘special’ trade relations based upon historical, colonial and political
ties.123 Thus the GSP scheme of the EC must be assessed to ensure that it does
not result in de facto discrimination such as to favour countries with which the
preference granting state has some sort of ‘special’ relationship. It is worth
noting that by 31 December 2008, developing country recipients under the
special incentives scheme will be expected to have ratiﬁed 27 separate con-
ventions.124 If the special incentive measures are ever challenged at WTO
level, the Panel/Appellate Body would be under an obligation to enquire as to
whether such an expectation is not unduly burdensome. The preamble to the
GSP states that the special incentive measures are designed to assist
developing countries which due to a lack of diversiﬁcation and insufﬁcient in-
tegration into the international trading system are vulnerable while assuming
special burdens and responsibilities due to the ratiﬁcation and effective imple-
mentation of core international conventions on human and labour rights, en-
vironmental protection and good governance should beneﬁt from additional
tariff preferences.
Thus, the special incentives are designed to assist countries which lack
diversiﬁcation in their export base, are insufﬁciently integrated into the in-
ternational trading system and are classed as vulnerable. Is limiting assistance
to those countries which have the necessary resources to undertake ratiﬁcation
of 27 different conventions actually a response to the identiﬁed needs? The
argument that additional preferences ‘will pay for themselves’ in terms of the
competitive advantage offered is rather reduced if one considers the growing
myriad of free trade agreements being negotiated by the European
Community. Goods from members of FTAs generally enter duty-free, thereby
trumping any tariff advantage offered under the special incentive arrange-
ments. In addition, recent economic literature has questioned the overall
beneﬁt of the GSP in that developing country ‘reliance’ upon preferential
122 Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 251997, para 233.
123 n 93. 124 Council Regulation (EC) 980/2005 Art 9(c).
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tariff treatment may in fact serve to delay their integration into multilateral
trading order.125
Any differentiation must be enacted as a positive response to ‘need’ while
the type of need to which a differential response would be appropriate is
‘limited to the “development, ﬁnancial and trade needs”’.
As iterated above, a ‘positive’ response to ‘need’ is characterized by con-
structive attitudes or actions. The consideration of whether an act is con-
structive arguably demands a process of evaluation. If we ascribe this
evaluative function to dispute settlement, then the Panel or Appellate Body
will be assigned a role with considerable political implications to the extent
that it will be tasked to consider whether an approach which differentiates
between recipients of tariff preferences is, in fact, ‘constructive’.
As to the question of whether committing to a host of environmental con-
ventions represents a ‘constructive’ response to a relevant development, trade
or ﬁnancial need, it is probably the case that the conventions represent a broad
reading of the concept of ‘sustainable development’. In footnote 107 of the
judgment of US–Shrimp, the Appellate Body noted in obiter commentary that
‘this concept [of sustainable development] has been gradually accepted as
integrating economic and social development and environmental protec-
tion’.126 In the same dispute, the Appellate Body held that ‘the preamble to the
WTO Agreement . . . acknowledges the ‘objective of sustainable develop-
ment’.127 In EC–Tariff Preferences, the Appellate Body conﬁrmed that
sustainable development constituted an ‘objective of the WTO’.128 The
link between promoting the economic growth of developing countries and
sustainable development is well established in international law and an
evolutionary reading of the concept of ‘development’ as listed in the GSP129
would probably recognize this.
However, the question of whether ‘the existence of a relevant need
is capable of objective assessment’ and whether there exists a ‘nexus’
between the need identiﬁed and the imposition of differential tariff
treatment is likely to be a more difﬁcult threshold to overcome with regard to
the inclusion of certain of the multilateral conventions on environmental
protection. While environmental protection has been identiﬁed as an element
of development,130 what is likely to cause concern is the objective logic
behind the inclusion of some of the conventions listed and whether or not they
125 O¨zden and Reinhardt, The Perversity of Preferences: The Generalized System of
Preferences and Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976–2000 (World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 2955, 2003).
126 Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 61998, n 107.
127 ibid para 129.
128 EC–Tariff Preferences Appellate para 94.
129 See discussion, n 99 et seq.
130 See, eg, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26
(vol I); 31 ILM 874 (1992) Art 4.
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merely pay lip service to the aim of environmental protection. The Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity has, for
example, been described as ‘open to inﬂuence by a broad range of protec-
tionist interests that have nothing to do with the protection of the environ-
ment’.131 It is contended that signiﬁcant negative externalities exist with
regards to the inclusion of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB)132
as one of the relevant conventions under the additional preferences scheme
offered by the European Communities.133 The Cartagena Protocol lay at the
centre of the WTO dispute of EC–Biotech134 which concerned complaints by
the United States,135 Canada,136 and Argentina137 regarding the Biotech
regulatory regime of the European Communities.138 It was the contention of
the European Communities that the interpretation of the relevant WTO
agreements of measures to preserve biodiversity should be consistent with the
CPB.139 The United States is not a party to the CPB and argued that measures
to preserve biodiversity should be in compliance with the WTO Sanitary and
Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Agreement.140
The second issue contested in EC–Biotech related to the permissibility of
the ‘precautionary principle’.141 The CPB is founded upon the ‘precautionary
principle’142 and the European Communities sought to rely on this within the
context of the dispute. The United States has stated its opposition to the use of
this principle on numerous occasions.143
131 Hobbs, Hobbs, and Kerr, ‘The Biosafety Protocol: Multilateral Agreement on Protecting
the Environment or Protectionist Club?’ (2005) 39(2) Journal of World Trade 281.
132 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 39 ILM 1, 27 (2000).
133 Council Regulation (EC) 980/2005 Annex III.
134 Panel Reports, European Communities–Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, WT/DS291/292/293, adopted 21 Nov 2006 (hereinafter EC–Biotech Panels).
135 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States European
Communities–Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS/
291/23 (8 Aug 2003).
136 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Canada, European Communities–Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS/292/17 (8 Aug 2003).
137 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Argentina, European Communities–Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS/293/17 (8 Aug 2003).
138 The DSB established a single panel to hear the complaints of all three parties at its
meeting on 29 August 2003. The Panel was composed on 4 March 2004, see URL<http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds293_e.htm> (last accessed 1 Sept 2006).
139 EC–Biotech Panels paras 4.300 et seq.
140 See US Oral Statement at the First Meeting of the Panel (2 June 2004) <http://www.
ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispute_
Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_ﬁle395_5542.pdf> (last accessed 25 Feb 2007).
141 There are numerous understandings accorded to the precautionary principle, however, Art
1 to the CBD explicitly references Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration which states that ‘in order
to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States ac-
cording to their capability. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation’, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol I); 31 ILM 874 (1992).
142 Cartagena Protocol Art 11.8.
143 Report of the Appellate Body European Communities–Measures concerning Meat and
Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 16 Jan 1998, 17.
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The Panel ultimately found against the European Communities.144 The
relevance of the dispute to our analysis lies in the positive act of the European
Communities in including the Cartagena Protocol within the conﬁnes of its
GSP additional preferences. The inclusion of the CPB may lead to negative
externalities with regard to certain developing countries which have signed
free trade agreements [FTA] with the United States145 which include pro-
visions to the effect that SPS measures may only be taken on the basis of
scientiﬁc measures, thereby rejecting the use of the principle of precaution.
Given that the relationship between the CPB and the WTO SPS Agreement is
still somewhat disputed, is it appropriate for the EC to include it as one of the
conventions requiring ratiﬁcation for developing countries to beneﬁt from the
special incentives mechanism of the GSP?
‘Precautions in the ﬁeld of biotechnology’146 have been termed by the
former DG Trade, Pascal Lamy, to be within the ‘collective preferences’ of
the EC.147 Collective preferences relate to the ‘end result of choices made by
human communities that apply to the community as a whole’.148 The duty to
safeguard collective preferences is listed as being a ‘sovereign duty’149 of all
political systems. By including the Cartagena Protocol within the context of
the GSP, is the EC simply exporting its collective preferences abroad to the
detriment of other trading partners such as the US? In addition, if the protec-
tion of collective preferences lies within the sovereign duty of all states, then
what of the sovereignty of developing nations to decide their own regulatory
regime for products of biotechnology?150
In the same regard, concern has been expressed that the United States has
been pressurizing smaller countries such as Sri Lanka, Croatia and Thailand to
prevent them from implementing strict regulatory systems for genetically
modiﬁed organisms [GMO].151 Given that the United States is the largest
exporter of products of biotechnology, the United States Trade Representative
has been under immense scrutiny from biotech interest groups to ensure open
markets for such goods.152 In relation, the previous United States Trade
144 EC–Biotech Panels, 303–7.
145 MC Cordonier, ‘The WTO, RTAs and Sustainable Development’ in L Bartels and F Ortino
(eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (OUP, Oxford, 2006) 330.
146 Pascal Lamy, ‘The Emergence of collective preferences in international trade:
implications for regulating globalisation’, speech made at conference on ‘Collective preferences
and global governance: what future for the multilateral trading system’ (15 Sept 2005)<http://
ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/lamy/speeches_articles/spla242_en.htm> (last
accessed 31 Aug 2006). 147 ibid.
148 ibid. 149 ibid.
150 For a southern critique of the idea of collective preferences, see ‘Full Interview
with Varanda Shiva’ Euractiv (8 Mar 2004) <http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/full-interview-
vandana-shiva-ills-world-trading-system/article-117411> (last accessed 1 Sept 2006); see also S
Charnovitz, ‘An Analysis of Pascal Lamy’s Proposal on Collective Preferences’ (2005) 8 Journal
of International Economic Law 449.
151 BRIDGES/ITCSD ‘US Steps Up Pressure Over Biotech Rules’ (20 Sept 2001) <http:
//www.ictsd.org/biores/01-12-20/story2.htm> (last accessed 23 Feb 2007).
152 Thailand threatened with s 301 action for its labelling regime in regard to GMOs.
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Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick has sought to link biotech with de-
velopment issues stating that the biotech area is
extremely important in terms of dealing with (issues) ranging from the
hundreds of millions of African children who have malnutrition to extreme
possibilities for beneﬁts in terms of growing food with fewer fertilizers and
pesticides.153
In addition, the enactment of the ‘United States Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act’ ties funding to ﬁght HIV/AIDS
with acceptance of GM food.154
The GMO debate has been described as ‘cold war’ between GMO pessi-
mists such as the EC, and GMO optimists such as the United States.155 This
GMO cold war has
placed strong pressures on developing countries to choose sides, undermining
their abilities to make independent judgements and choices with regard to
whether or how GM biotechnologies ﬁt their particular circumstances.
This stress upon developing countries ‘choosing’ sides can only serve to
undermine their independence and autonomy to make strategic choices re-
garding their agricultural development and whether their needs mandate the
use, or indeed non-use, of GMOs.156
With regard to the inclusion of the CBD as one of the multilateral agree-
ments requiring ratiﬁcation under the EC GSP special incentives arrange-
ments, it could be argued that its selection represents the pursuit of European
values of pessimism towards GM? To expand, could the relevant ‘develop-
ment, ﬁnancial or trade’ need to which the grant of preferences is intended to
respond be skewered in such a way as to promote the preference granting
state’s interests? It is notable that the Appellate Body does not make more of
the input of the GSP recipient state with regard to discerning the existence of a
relevant ‘developmental, ﬁnancial or trade need’.
Rather, the Appellate Body held that ‘[b]road-based recognition of a particular
need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments adopted by
international organizations can act as this standard’ (emphasis added).157
It is noted that the operative word in the Appellate Body’s statement is the
word ‘can’ and not ‘shall’. It would appear that multilateral recognition in the
form of legal instrument or international treaties is not deﬁnitively necessary
and that developed country donors are largely ‘self policing’ in delineating the
153 Cited in BRIDGES/ICTSD ‘US Pressures WTO Members on GMOs’ (24 Jan 2002)
<http://www.ictsd.org/biores/02-01-24/story1.htm> (last accessed 23 Feb 2007).
154 E Meijer and R Stewart, ‘The GM Cold War: How Developing Countries Can Go from
Being Dominos to Being Players’ (2004) 13(3) Review of European Community and International
Environmental Law 247, 253.
155 ibid 252. 156 ibid 261.
157 EC–Tariff Preferences Appellate (n) para 163.
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development, ﬁnancial or trade ‘need’ to be addressed.158 Schaffer and Apea
have remarked that the relative autonomy of developed country donor states to
discern the relevant ‘need’ creates a situation in which ‘developing countries
are seriously affected by . . . EC decisions without having much impact into
the decision-making process’.159
With regards to the various agreements relating to environmental protection
contained in the GSP offer of the EC, it is difﬁcult to discern the reasons why
those particular agreements were chosen. There are over 250 MEAs currently
in existence. This vast proliferation of international concern for environmental
protection has created a situation in which both developed and developing
countries have to assess and prioritize the requisite advantages and demerits of
each agreement. Each state is sovereign and will ultimately have a better
conception of their own needs than outside observers. However, within the
context of the GSP, it has been demonstrated that the assessment of ‘need’
to which measures of GSP positive conditionality are intended to respond
lies solely with the GSP granting state. While the GSP is a ‘unilateral’ trade
instrument, the autonomy of the granting state to designate need may serve to
undermine the mechanism of the GSP as a tool with which to effect devel-
opment. The position of the GSP granting state as the sole arbiter (with
appropriate evidence, where applicable, from international bodies) of what
constitutes need lies in stark contrast to the Panel’s ﬁndings in Brazil–
Aircraft160 which upheld the right of a developing country to assess their own
development needs. In considering the question of whether export subsidies
granted by Brazil to foreign purchasers of Brazil’s Embraer aircraft, the Panel
(and to a lesser extent the Appellate Body) showed considerable deference161
to the ability of Brazil to identify its own development needs. In doing so, the
Panel stated that
an examination as to whether export subsidies are inconsistent with a developing
country member’s needs is an inquiry of a peculiarly economic and political
nature, and notably ill-suited to review by a panel whose function is primarily
legal.162
While Brazil–Aircraft dealt with the special and differential treatment (SDT)
provisions of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement,
SDT is part of the regime established by the Enabling Clause to secure the
economic development of developing states and thus the substantive divisions
between the EC–Tariff Preferences case and that of Brazil–Aircraft are not as
158 Shaffer and Apea, ‘Institutional Choice in the General System of Preferences Case: Who
Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law and Politics of Rights’ (2005) 39 Journal
of World Trade 977, 996. 159 ibid.
160 Panel Report, Brazil–Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R, adopted 20
Aug 1999 (hereinafter Brazil–Aircraft).
161 For a discussion on this point, see Footer, ‘Developing Country Practice and WTO Dispute
Settlement’ (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 55, 87.
162 Brazil–Aircraft, para 7.89.
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substantial as they would at ﬁrst appear. While one must always be careful
to compare like with like, surely the precedent in Brazil–Aircraft to the
effect that developing countries should have autonomy to assess their own
development needs should be applicable to other cases under the Enabling
Clause and SDT measures more speciﬁcally.
In a recent Commission White Paper on the subject of ‘Opening the Door
to Development’, note is made of the importance of European markets to
developing countries.
EU preferential systems, either unilateral (GSP) or based on bilateral
and regional agreements (Economic Partnership Agreements and Free
Trade Areas) also have at their heart European values, as, more and more, de-
veloping countries that base their internal governance on high social and en-
vironmental standards will have better access to our market (emphasis added).163
Similarly, in a speech to the European Parliament in 2001, the Commission
made clear that the drug arrangements offered under the then current GSP
would be part of a quid pro quo for European values and investment. In
essence, the Latin American countries offered GSP concessions under the
Drug Arrangements would be expected ‘to respond to the special access we
are offering them to the European market by promoting foreign—and in par-
ticular European—direct investment, tackling corruption and battling for
social justice’.164
The promotion of values through the GSP can be contextualized within
the much wider debate as to the normative frame through which one
should view the exercise of global governance.165 Should we view the GSP
through a normative frame which sets the promotion of values such as ‘good
governance’ and ‘sustainable development’ as preeminent or should trade
liberalization and market access be depicted as the dominant factor?
The problem, for one commentator, is that a
normative frame based on a dichotomy of trade liberalization goals and
‘American’ and European ‘values’ reﬂected in preference schemes ignores that
others around the world see themselves neither in a ‘free trade’ camp nor an
American value camp. They rather distrust the language of ‘American values’
because it can camouﬂage the pursuit of ‘American interests’ in relation to de-
veloping countries.166
In the same way, the pursuit of European ‘collective preferences’ via the GSP
may impact negatively upon developing country recipients. The use of trade
163 Commission White Paper on Opening the Door to Development: Developing Country
Access to EU Markets 1999–2003 (23 May 2005) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2005/august/tradoc_123305.pdf> (last accessed 25 Feb 2007).
164 Speech to the European Parliament on ‘The Community 2002–2004 GSP: An Instrument of
Sustainable Development’ Strasbourg (12 June 2001) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2004/october/tradoc_119427.pdf> (last accessed 25 Feb 2007).
165 Shaffer and Apea (n 158). 166 ibid.
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measures to promote sustainable development should therefore aim to pro-
mote cooperation and multilateral, as opposed to unilateral, values.
VI. CONCLUSION
The link between trade and environmental protection has long been a
contentious one. It has been pointed out that the WTO is primarily a trade
organisation and while the Uruguay Round culminated in the establishment
of a Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE), this has failed to
accomplish anything beyond acting as a mere talking shop in relation to
environmental matters. It has been singularly unsuccessful in fulﬁlling its two-
tiered mandate to make recommendations as to whether any modiﬁcations are
needed to the existing WTO system and identify the relationship between
trade measures and environmental measures167 in relation to the pursuit of
sustainable development.168
Thus, despite the fact that many multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs) contain allowance for trade measures, there has been no decisive or
coherent statement emanating from the WTO as regards to the relationship
between the two. There is also the issue that many MEAs have their
own dispute settlement mechanisms raising the spectre of parties ‘forum
shopping’169 in order to ﬁnd the body that will deliver the most favourable
outcome. Such a situation does not serve to create coherence within the system
of environmental governance. Indeed, the interaction between MEAs and the
WTO is reﬂected by the fact that several of the more recent environmental
agreements use language from the GATT in their approach to restrictions on
trade.170
There have been numerous statements emanating from within the WTO and
various member countries that it is not the forum within which to discuss
environmental issues. For example, in 2001 three former Director-Generals of
the WTO issued a statement to the effect that, ‘the WTO cannot be used as a
Christmas Tree on which to hang any good cause that may be secured by
exercising trade power’.171 Such views have taken on particular resonance in
167 See WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration para 31 (i) calling for negotiations to explore ‘the
relationship between existing WTO rules and speciﬁc trade obligations set out in multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs’ WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1.
168 S Shaw and R Schwartz, ‘Trade and the Environment in the WTO: State of Play’ (2002) 36
Journal of World Trade 129, 130.
169 D Brack and K Gray, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO, paper pre-
sented to the IISD/RIIA Workshop on Trade and Sustainable Development Priorities Post Doha,
London, 7–8 Apr 2003, 28.
170 D Brack and T Branczik, Trade and Environment in the WTO: After Cancun (Royal
Institute of International Affairs, London 2004).
171 As cited in S Charnovitz, ‘Triangulating the World Trade Organisation’, (2002) 96
American Journal of International Law 28, 29.
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light of cases heard within the WTO Dispute Settlement Body such as the so-
called Shrimp–Turtle172 dispute.
The view that the WTO is not the place for discussing issues pertaining to
the environment loses potency when one considers that the environment,
through its link with sustainable development, has always been part of the
remit and thus the system of values inherent within the WTO.173 Indeed, more
recent statements from the current Director General of the WTO, Pascal
Lamy, reveal something of a more enthusiastic approach to dealing with
environmental concerns within the auspices of the WTO.174 The dispute of
EC–Tariff Preferences introduced into the jurisprudence of the WTO the idea
that ‘development’ is an evolutionary concept encompassing ‘sustainable
development’.175 Concern for the development of less developed countries
therefore can include matters such as environmental protection. However, the
pursuit of environmental protection and development through trade should
aim to promote cooperation and multilateral values.
With regard to the current GSP scheme of the European Communities, it
has been demonstrated above that the requirement for beneﬁciary seeking
developing countries to ratify the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety may owe
much to a concern for the promotion of European ‘values.’ In this regard, it
should be noted that the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change has also been included as one of the conven-
tions requiring ratiﬁcation under the ‘special incentives’ scheme. The Kyoto
Protocol has been the scene of recent clashes between the European
Communities and the United States with the former French premier, Jacques
Chirac, recently proposing to issue a ‘border tax adjustment’ upon goods
which are produced by countries which have not signed up to Kyoto.176 The
European Communities has been exerting considerable pressure on third
countries to sign up to the Kyoto, as evidenced by media reports which have
suggested that European support for Russian accession to the WTO was made
dependent upon Russian support for Kyoto.177 While efforts to address the
problem of climate change are needed ever more urgently, countries granting
GSP concessions should avoid the use of the GSP as a tool with which to
pursue values of importance to them. In assessing the existence of a relevant
172 Appellate Body report of United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 61998.
173 See WTO Ministerial Declaration (n 167) para 6 which notes that Members ‘strongly
reafﬁrm our commitment to the objective of sustainable development, as stated in the Preamble to
the Marrakesh Agreement’.
174 Speech by Pascal Lamy, ‘Lamy Urges Support for environmental chapter in the
WTO’ (5 Feb 2007)<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl54_e.htm> (last accessed
28 Feb 2007).
175 See discussion (n 129) et seq.
176 Bennhold, ‘France Tells US to Sign Climate Pact or Face Tax’ New York Times, New York,
1 Feb 2007.
177 McCarthy et al, ‘Russia Finally Backs Kyoto: Does it Matter?’ The Independent, London,
1 Oct 2004.
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need to be addressed by measures of conditionality in the GSP, the Appellate
Body in any future dispute should place more emphasis upon the involvement
of developing country recipients of tariff concessions in assessing their own
needs. While the GSP is inherently a ‘unilateral’ trade instrument, any con-
ditionality should reﬂect a genuine ‘partnership for development’.
In a similar vein, it has been demonstrated that the requirement of ratiﬁ-
cation by 2008 of all 27 conventions listed in the GSP regulation may be
overly burdensome to certain eligibility-seeking countries. As such, the rati-
ﬁcation requirement may have a ‘disparate impact’ upon individual countries
such as to breach the obligation that the additional preferences are available to
all similarly situated countries sharing the same need. This article calls for the
European Communities to assess the ‘impact’ of the ratiﬁcation requirement
upon each of the countries concerned. Such an assessment would be in
line with the recent efforts of the European Communities to introduce ‘sus-
tainability impact assessments’ into its trade agreements.178
178 Communication from the European Commission on Impact Assessment, COM(2002)276
ﬁnal (not published in the Ofﬁcial Journal).
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